Author List: Lahiri, Atanu; Dewan, Rajiv M.; Freimer, Marshall;
Information Systems Research, 2013, Volume 24, Issue 2, Page 418-435.
As the ability to measure technology resource usage gets easier with increased connectivity, the question whether a technology resource should be priced by the amount of the resource used or by the particular use of the resource has become increasingly important. We examine this issue in the context of pricing of wireless services: should the price be based on the service, e.g., voice, multimedia messages, short messages, or should it be based on the traffic generated? Many consumer advocates oppose discriminatory pricing across services believing that it enriches carriers at the expense of consumers. The opposition to discrimination has grown significantly, and it has even prompted the U.S. Congress to question executives of some of the biggest carriers. With this ongoing debate on discrimination in mind, we compare two pricing regimes here. One regime, namely, service pricing, involves pricing different services differently. The other one, namely, traffic pricing, involves pricing the traffic (i.e., bytes) transmitted. We show why the common wisdom, that discriminatory pricing across services increases profits and harms consumers, may not always hold. We also show that such discrimination can increase social welfare.
Keywords: dumb pipe; net neutrality; nonlinear pricing; quasi-bundling; second-degree discrimination; telecommunication
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#195 0.517 pricing services levels level on-demand different demand capacity discrimination mechanism schemes conditions traffic paper resource expected based constraints solution latency
#5 0.138 consumer consumers model optimal welfare price market pricing equilibrium surplus different higher results strategy quality cost lower competition firm paper
#138 0.079 use question opportunities particular identify information grammars researchers shown conceptual ontological given facilitate new little constraints dual answer post-adoption theory
#19 0.077 content providers sharing incentive delivery provider net incentives internet service neutrality broadband allow capacity congestion revenue cost efficient enhanced provides
#40 0.061 increased increase number response emergency monitoring warning study reduce messages using reduced decreased reduction decrease act sessions cost good key