Author List: Kramer, Jan; Wiewiorra, Lukas;
Information Systems Research, 2012, Volume 23, Issue 4, Page 1303-1321.
We study departures from network neutrality through implementing a quality of service tiering regime in which an Internet service provider charges for prioritization on a nondiscriminatory basis. We find that quality of service tiering may be more efficient in the short run because it better allocates the existing network capacity and in the long run because it provides higher investment incentives due to the increased demand for priority services by the entry of new congestion sensitive content providers. Which network regime is the most efficient depends on the distribution of congestion sensitivity among content providers, but a guideline is that the regime that provides higher incentives for infrastructure investments is more efficient in the long run.
Keywords: content variety; investment; net neutrality; quality of service; regulation; telecommunications
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#19 0.461 content providers sharing incentive delivery provider net incentives internet service neutrality broadband allow capacity congestion revenue cost efficient enhanced provides
#112 0.186 services service network effects optimal online pricing strategies model provider provide externalities providing base providers fee complementary demand offer derive
#271 0.106 technology investments investment information firm firms profitability value performance impact data higher evidence diversification industry payoff return findings decisions greater
#23 0.098 channel distribution demand channels sales products long travel tail new multichannel available product implications strategy allows internet revenue technologies times
#236 0.081 form items item sensitive forms variety rates contexts fast coefficients meaning higher robust scores hardware providing compared single complete subgroups