Author List: Das, Sanjukta; Du, Anna Ye; Gopal, Ram D.; Ramesh, Ram;
Information Systems Research, 2011, Volume 22, Issue 4, Page 756-773.
Online storage service providers grant a way for companies to avoid spending resources on maintaining their own in-house storage infrastructure and thereby allowing them to focus on their core business activities. These providers, however, follow a fixed, posted pricing strategy that charges the same price in each time period and thus bear all the risk arising out of demand uncertainties faced by their client companies. We examine the effects of providing a spot market with dynamic prices and forward contracts to hedge against future revenue uncertainty. We derive revenue-maximizing spot and forward prices for a single seller facing a known set of buyers. We perform a simulation study using publicly available traffic data regarding Amazon S3 clients from Alexa.com to validate our analytical results. Our field study supports our analysis and indicates that spot markets alone can enhance revenues to Amazon, but this comes at the cost of increased risks due to the increased market share in the spot markets. Furthermore, adding a forward contract feature to the spot markets can reduce risks while still providing the benefits of enhanced revenues. Although the buyers incur an increase in costs in the spot market, adding a forward contract does not cause any additional cost increase while transferring the risk to the buyers. Thus, storage grid providers can greatly benefit by applying a forward contract alongside the spot market.
Keywords: forward contracts; grid computing; market mechanism design; online storage
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#41 0.176 price prices dispersion spot buying good transaction forward retailers commodity pricing collected premium customers using posted relatively obtain listing uncertainty
#112 0.176 services service network effects optimal online pricing strategies model provider provide externalities providing base providers fee complementary demand offer derive
#40 0.121 increased increase number response emergency monitoring warning study reduce messages using reduced decreased reduction decrease act sessions cost good key
#70 0.103 contract contracts incentives incentive outsourcing hazard moral contracting agency contractual asymmetry incomplete set cost client parties examine effort structures double
#242 0.099 market competition competitive network markets firms products competing competitor differentiation advantage competitors presence dominant structure share using incumbent make important
#264 0.070 risk risks management associated managing financial appropriate losses expected future literature reduce loss approach alternative mitigate failures failure cause mitigation