Author List: Sen, Sagnika; Raghu, T. S.; Vinze, Ajay;
Journal of Management Information Systems, 2010, Volume 26, Issue 4, Page 287-316.
In an information technology services outsourcing arrangement, variance in demand volume and individual user preferences pose significant challenges to the provider organization in making resource allocation decisions. Such variations affect service levels, especially under fixed resource constraints. We explore the possible role of periodic demand information sharing and subsequent resource-level adjustments as a means of addressing issues arising from demand variation. As information exchange alters the dynamics of the relationship between the customer and provider organizations, incorporating information sharing in service-level agreements requires modifying current pricing schemes. A pricing heuristic is developed and tested under varying levels of information accuracy and granularity. The heuristic is shown to provide better economic welfare for both participants in comparison to the baseline pricing strategies considered. Also, it is shown that information, even at a coarse level of granularity, is very effective in providing stable service levels--a finding that is encouraging for enhanced collaborations between customer and provider organizations in outsourcing arrangements.
Keywords: heterogeneous demand; information sharing; IT services; pricing
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#195 0.257 pricing services levels level on-demand different demand capacity discrimination mechanism schemes conditions traffic paper resource expected based constraints solution latency
#211 0.128 service services delivery quality providers technology information customer business provider asp e-service role variability science propose logic companies especially customers
#170 0.121 information processing needs based lead make exchange situation examined ownership analytical improved situations changes informational examine developed receive perceptions facilitates
#19 0.116 content providers sharing incentive delivery provider net incentives internet service neutrality broadband allow capacity congestion revenue cost efficient enhanced provides
#208 0.112 feedback mechanisms mechanism ratings efficiency role effective study economic design potential economics discuss profile recent component granularity turn compared using