Poaching and the Misappropriation of Information: Transaction Risks of Information Exchange.

Author List: Clemons, Eric K.; Hitt, Lorin M.;

Journal of Management Information Systems, 2004, Volume 21, Issue 2, Page 87-107.

We address the concept of poaching, the risk that in any transactional relationship, information that is transferred between parties for purposes specified in the contract will deliberately be used by the receiving party for purposes outside the contract, to its own economic benefit, and to the detriment of the party that provided the information. We argue that this form of transactional risk, a component of transaction costs, is increasingly important in our service-centered, information-driven, postindustrial economy. Using case examples and a discussion of the related literature, we demonstrate and discuss the conditions under which shared information creates the potential for poaching, examine the impact and efficacy of traditional remedies for contractual problems in managing poaching, and identify additional mechanisms for managing poaching risk. Our analysis suggests that these risks and their remedies are fundamentally different in nature from those considered in previous theories of supplier relations and contractual governance.

Keywords: economic analysis of information; incomplete contracts; information sharing; intellectual property; managing risks; transaction cost theory

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List of Topics

#0	0.220	information types different type sources analysis develop used behavior specific conditions consider improve using alternative understanding data available main target
#274	0.161	outsourcing transaction cost partnership information economics relationships outsource large-scale contracts specificity perspective decisions long-term develop requirements economic association factors hypotheses
#264	0.148	risk risks management associated managing financial appropriate losses expected future literature reduce loss approach alternative mitigate failures failure cause mitigation
#25	0.116	relationships relationship relational information interfirm level exchange relations perspective model paper interpersonal expertise theory study effects literature role social identify
#70	0.103	contract contracts incentives incentive outsourcing hazard moral contracting agency contractual asymmetry incomplete set cost client parties examine effort structures double
#122	0.064	attention utilization existing codification model received does limitations theories receiving literature paying causes additional building examine examination focusing technological initial