Author List: Galbreth, Michael R.; Shor, Mikhael;
MIS Quarterly, 2010, Volume 34, Issue 3, Page 595-A10.
In this paper, a competitive software market that includes horizontal and quality differentiation, as well as a negative network effect driven by the presence of malicious agents, is modeled. Software products with larger installed bases, and therefore more potential computers to attack, present more appealing targets for malicious agents. One finding is that software firms may profit from increased malicious activity. Software products in a more competitive market are less likely to invest in security, while monopolistic or niche products are likely to be more secure from malicious attack. The results provide insights for IS managers considering enterprise software adoption.
Keywords: game theory; network externalities; software selection
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#242 0.258 market competition competitive network markets firms products competing competitor differentiation advantage competitors presence dominant structure share using incumbent make important
#73 0.175 security threat information users detection coping configuration avoidance response firm malicious attack intrusion appraisal countermeasures benefit costs threats ability rate
#34 0.161 negotiation negotiations using potential power agreement paper bases partners ending negotiators offers visualization messaging instant audio e-marketplaces provide positions agents
#232 0.143 software development product functionality period upgrade sampling examines extent suggests factors considered useful uncertainty previous called complementarities greater cost present
#5 0.068 consumer consumers model optimal welfare price market pricing equilibrium surplus different higher results strategy quality cost lower competition firm paper
#250 0.057 enterprise improvement organizations process applications metaphors packaged technology organization help knows extends improved overcoming package learning better evolution build lead